State v. Johnston Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 42472 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
10-27-2015
State v. Johnston Respondent's Brief Dckt. 42472
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Johnston Respondent's Brief Dckt. 42472" (2015). Not Reported. 2014.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/2014
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DANIEL GEORGE JOHNSTON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) No. 42472 
) 
) Bonneville Co. Case No. 
) CR-2013-4282 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________ ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
HONORABLE DANE H. WATKINS, JR. 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P. 0. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-001 0 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
SALLY J. COOLEY 
Deputy State Appellate 
Public Defender 
P. 0. Box 2816 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 334-2712 
ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
FIL 0-COP 
OCT 2 7 2015 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
) 
) No.42472 
) 
COPY 
vs. 
) Bonneville Co. Case No. 
) CR-2013-4282 
) 
DANIEL GEORGE JOHNSTON, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
_____________ ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
HONORABLE DANE H. WATKINS, JR. 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P. 0. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
SALLY J. COOLEY 
Deputy State Appellate 
Public Defender 
P. 0. Box 2816 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 334-2712 
ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................. 1 
Nature Of The Case ................................................................................. 1 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ......................... 1 
ISSUES ................................................................................................................ 3 
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................... 4 
I. Johnston's Claim That The Amendment Of 
The Information Deprived The District Court 
Of Jurisdiction Is Without Merit .................................................. .4 
A. Introduction .......................................................................... 4 
B. Standard Of Review .......................................................... .4 
C. The Amendment To The Information 
Did Not Deprive The District Court Of 
Its Previously Vested Jurisdiction ......................................... .4 
II. Johnston Has Failed To Show Error In The 
District Court's Ruling That The Michigan First 
Degree Sexual Conduct Statute Defined A 
Crime Substantially Equivalent To An Idaho 
Offense Requiring Registration As A Sex Offender ......................... 9 
A. Introduction ........................................................................... 9 
B. Standard Of Review ............................................................ 10 
C. First Degree Sexual Conduct Is The 
Substantial Equivalent Of Idaho Crimes 
Requiring Sex Offender Registration .................................. 10 
CONCLUSION .. . . . . .. . .. . . .. .. . . .. .. . .. .. .. . . . . . . .. .. . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. . . . . .. . . .. .. . . . .. . . . .............. 12 
OF SERVICE ........................................................................... 12 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
State v. Dickerson, 142 Idaho 514, 129 P.3d 1263 (Ct. App. 2006) ................... 10 
Statev. Doyle, 121 Idaho 911,828 P.2d 1316 (1992) ......................................... 4 
State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 261 P.3d 519 (2011) ............................... 4, 6, 7, 8 
State v. Herrera, 149 Idaho 216, 233 P.3d 147 (2009) ................................. 7, 8, 9 
State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 101 P.3d 699 (2004) ........................................... 4 
State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 252 P.3d 1255 (2011) ....................................... 4, 6 
State v. Quintero, 141 Idaho 619, 115 P.3d 710 (2005) ....................................... 6 
State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 91 P.3d 1127 (2004) ..................................... 5, 9 
State v. Schmeirer, Idaho_,_ P.3d , 
2014 WL 6652924 (Ct. App. 2014) ........................................................... 7 
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996) ........................................ 11 
STATUTES 
1.C. § 18-1508 .................................................................................................... 10 
1.C. § 18-6101 .................................................................................................... 10 
1.C. § 18-8304 ................................................................................................. 10 
1.C. § 18-8307 .............................................................................................. 5, 6, 9 
I.C. § 18-8309 .............................................................................................. 5, 6, 9 
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.§ 750b(1)(a) ................................................................. 10 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Daniel George Johnston appeals from his conviction for failure to register 
as a sex offender. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The Bonneville County Sherriff's Office received information from 
Michigan that Johnston, a "non-compliant and absconded Sex Offender," was 
living in that county. (R., p. 15.) The information from Michigan indicated that 
Johnston has a lifetime registration requirement based on prior convictions in 
Michigan. (Id.) The state charged Johnston with failure to register as a sex 
offender, asserting that he was required to register as the result of a 1990 
Michigan conviction for First Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct. (R., pp. 26-27, 
65-66.) 
Johnston filed a motion to dismiss, claiming he had no duty to register as 
a sex offender in Idaho. (R., pp. 96-110.) One of the arguments made was that 
"no official determination has been made ... that the Michigan convictions alleged 
by the State are substantially similar to any Idaho crime specifically set forth in 
the statute." (R., p. 105.) The district court held a hearing at which it took 
argument, but no evidence. (2/10/14 Tr., p. 3, L. 1 - p. 21, L. 25; R., pp. 70-71.) 
The district court then denied the motion. (2/10/14 Tr., p. 22, L. 1 - p. 29, L. 1; 
R., pp. 70-71.) The district court determined that the Michigan conviction was for 
an offense substantially equivalent to Idaho sex offenses requiring registration, 
specifically lewd conduct with a child under the age of 16 and rape. (2/10/14 Tr., 
1 
28, Ls. 3-24 ) Thereafter Johnston entered a guilty plea, preserving his right 
appeal motion (R., district 
court sentenced Johnston to seven years with two years determinate, suspended 
with probation, and entered judgment, from which Johnston timely appealed. (R., 
pp. 113-25.) 
2 
ISSUES 
issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err by denying Mr. Johnston's motion 
dismiss? 
2. Did the district court have subject matter jurisdiction to 
convict Mr. Johnston? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Is Johnston's argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction, raised for 
the first time on appeal, meritless? 
2. Has Johnston failed to show error in the district court's ruling that the 
Michigan First Degree Sexual Conduct statute defined a crime 
substantially equivalent to an Idaho offense requiring registration as a sex 
offender? 
3 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Johnston's Claim That The Amendment Of The Information Deprived The District 
Court Of Jurisdiction Is Without Merit 
A. Introduction 
For the first time on appeal, Johnston claims the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea. (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-23.) Specifically, 
he claims that an amendment to the information deprived the district court of 
jurisdiction. (Appellant's brief, p. 15.) Review of the procedural history of this 
case and application of the law to the facts shows this argument is meritless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law that may be raised at 
any time and is subject to de novo review. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 
101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004). Whether a particular crime is considered an included 
offense is also a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. 
State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 527, 261 P.3d 519, 521 (2011 ). 
C. The Amendment To The Information Did Not Deprive The District Court Of 
Its Previously Vested Jurisdiction 
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to determine cases over a general 
type or class of dispute." State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 840, 252 P.3d 1255, 
1258 (2011) (internal quotes omitted). Idaho courts have "subject matter 
jurisdiction over a crime if any essential element of the crime, including the result, 
occurs within Idaho." State v. Doyle, 121 Idaho 911, 914, 828 P.2d 1316, 1319 
(1992). "The information, indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was 
4 
committed within the State of Idaho confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the 
State v. Rogers, 1 Idaho 228, 91 11 11 
invalid charging document does not confer subject matter jurisdiction. Lute, 150 
Idaho at 840-41, 252 P.3d at 1258-59. 
The state's criminal complaint set forth several statutes the state alleged 
Johnston had violated, including both I.C. §§ 18-8309 and 18-8307. (R., pp. 10-
11.) After a preliminary hearing the magistrate found probable cause to believe 
Johnston had been in the state since 2005 and had complied with none of the 
registration requirements. (4/05/13 Tr., p. 53, L. 1 - p. 54, L. 2; R., p. 23.) The 
state filed an information charging Johnston with failure to "register change of 
address or name" pursuant to I.C. § 18-8309. (R., pp. 26-27 (capitalization 
altered).) The facts alleged in the information were as follows: 
The Defendant, DANIEL GEORGE JOHNSTON, convicted as a 
sex offender on January 17, 1990, for the charge of Criminal 
Sexual Conduct 1st Degree and May 17, 1989, for the charge of 
Attempted Criminal Sexual Conduct 4th Degree, and residing in the 
State of Idaho, on or between 2008 and 2013, in the County of 
Bonneville, State of Idaho, did wrongfully fail to inform the law 
enforcement agency with whom DANIEL GEORGE JOHNSTON 
last registered, of his change of address, in writing, within two (2) 
days of such change. 
(Id.) The state later filed a motion to amend the information to charge "failure to 
register" under I.C. § 18-8307, "for the reason that the statue [sic] better reflects 
the evidence of the crime." (R., p. 60 (capitalization altered).) Johnston did not 
object to the motion, the district court granted it, and the state filed an amended 
information. (R., pp. 63, 65-66.) The facts alleged in the amended information 
were as follows: 
5 
(Id.) 
The Defendant, DANIEL GEORGE JOHNSTON, between 2008 
and 2013, in the State of Idaho, failed to register with the sheriff of 
the county in which the defendant resided or was temporarily 
domiciled, within two (2) working days of coming into that county 
and did fail to register annually, and the Defendant was at that time 
required to register under the Sex Offender Registration Act as a 
result of his January, 1990 conviction for First Degree Criminal 
Sexual Conduct in Michigan. 
The record in this case thus shows that the state's complaint alleged a 
violation of both I.C. § 18-8309 (failure to register a change of address) and I.C. 
§18-8307 (failure to register), and the magistrate found probable cause to believe 
that Johnston had complied with none of his registration requirements. 1 The 
state's first information included only the I.C. § 18-8309 (failure to register a 
change of address) violation, and the amended information included only the I.C. 
§ 18-8307 (failure to register) violation. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has declared a charging document 
jurisdictionally invalid under two circumstances. First, if the grand jury returns an 
information after its term has expired. Lute, 150 Idaho at 840-41, 252 P. 3d at 
1258-59 ("where a grand jury does not have a legally recognized existence, any 
indictments that a grand jury returns are invalid"). Second, where the defendant 
was acquitted of the charged offense at trial and the district court allowed a post-
acquittal amendment to a non-included offense. State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 
1 Johnston complains that factual allegations in the complaint did not support a 
charge under both I.C. §§ 18-8309 and 18-8307 (Appellant's brief, p. 17, n.7), but 
such is not a jurisdictional claim. State v. Quintero, 141 Idaho 619, 621-22, 115 
P.3d 710, 712-13 (2005) (failure to allege facts sufficient to support conviction not 
jurisdictional defect). 
6 
261 P.3d 519, 520 (2011 ).2 The Idaho Supreme Court has never held that a 
a non-included offense 
document. 
Consistent with this existing precedent, the Idaho Court of Appeals has 
held that a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over an improperly included 
offense. In State v. Herrera, 149 Idaho 216, 218, 233 P.3d 147, 149 (2009), the 
state charged Herrera and his co-defendant with conspiracy to traffic in heroin 
and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine. For the first time on appeal Herrera claimed 
the district court erroneously instructed the jury it could consider delivery of 
cocaine as an included offense of conspiracy to deliver cocaine. ~ at 221, 233 
P.3d at 152. The Court concluded Herrera's argument that the error was 
jurisdictional was "without merit": 
The district court acquired subject matter jurisdiction in the 
defendants' case upon the filing of the indictment. State v. Jones, 
140 Idaho 755, 757-58, 101 P.3d 699, 701-02 (2004). Even if an 
improper lesser included offense instruction was given, the court's 
subject matter jurisdiction that was conferred via the indictment 
remained throughout the trial, for subject matter jurisdiction does 
not depend upon the correctness of any decision made by the 
court. [State v.J Rogers, 140 Idaho [223,J 228, 91 P.3d [1127,] 
1132 [(2004)]. Accordingly, the defendants' challenge to the 
delivery instruction, raised for the first time on this appeal, will not 
be considered by this Court. 
kt at 221-222, 233 P.3d at 152-153. 
2 The Idaho Court of Appeals has applied Flegel more broadly than its facts and 
held that a pre-trial amendment to a non-included offense, agreed to by the 
defendant, rendered the charging document invalid. State v. Schmeirer, _ 
Idaho_, _ P.3d _, 2014 WL 6652924 (Ct. App. 2014), petition for review 
granted. 
7 
"Johnston asserts that the Amended Information failed impart 
it charged a crime than the charged in 
original Information." (Appellant's brief, p. 20.) He relies on State v. Flegel, 151 
Idaho 525, 526, 261 P.3d 519, 520 (2011), to support this claim. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 21-22.) Review of the Flegel opinion shows it does not support his 
claim. 
In Flegel the defendant was acquitted, after a trial, of the charged crime of 
lewd conduct. Flegel, 151 Idaho at 526, 261 P.3d at 520. Sexual abuse had 
also been submitted to the jury as an included offense, and the jury hung on that 
crime. kl After trial the prosecutor amended the charge from lewd conduct to 
sexual abuse without resubmission to a grand jury. kt_ "Because Sexual Abuse 
is not a lesser included offense of Lewd Conduct, Flegel could only be validly 
charged by indictment with that crime if the matter was resubmitted to the grand 
jury and it returned the amended indictment." kl 
Unlike in Herrera, where the properly brought conspiracy charge was still 
unresolved, the district court in Flegel did not enjoy continuing jurisdiction. 
Rather, the acquittal on the only valid charge ended the court's jurisdiction. There 
was simply no charging document left to amend because the sexual abuse 
charge was not an included offense. The charging document was rendered 
invalid not by any error of the court or prosecutor, but because of the acquittal. 
This case is like Herrera in that there was no ending of jurisdiction. There 
is no doubt that the district court had jurisdiction at the time it ruled on the motion 
to amend. Thus any error in amending the charge was simply error, not a 
8 
jurisdictional invalidation of the charging document. 
1 
3d 1127, 1132 (2004)). 
53 State v. Rogers, 1 
Herrera, 149 
228, 9 
In addition, the record in this case shows that the amendment was to 
allege a charge included in the complaint and on which the magistrate found 
probable cause. Johnston has presented no theory under which the district court 
would have been deprived of jurisdiction if the state's original information had 
charged I.C. §18-8307 (failure to register) instead of or in addition to I.C. § 18-
8309 (failure to register a change of address). Because the district court would 
have had jurisdiction over the charge had it been brought in the original 
information, there is no reasonable view of the law that would deprive the district 
court of jurisdiction merely because the charge was not included until the filing of 
the amended information. 
The amended information alleged a crime in the state of Idaho. It 
therefore alleged every jurisdictional prerequisite. Johnston's belief that it was 
somehow improperly amended does not show a lack of jurisdiction. 
11. 
Johnston Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Ruling That The 
Michigan First Degree Sexual Conduct Statute Defined A Crime Substantially 
Equivalent To An Idaho Offense Requiring Registration As A Sex Offender 
A. Introduction 
The district court determined that Johnston's Michigan conviction for First 
Degree Sexual Conduct was substantially equivalent to the Idaho crimes of lewd 
and lascivious conduct and rape. (2/10/14 Tr., p. 28, Ls. 3-24.) Johnston makes 
9 
several arguments why he believes this was error (Appellant's brief, 6-15), 
arguments are 
Standard Of Review 
Whether a foreign conviction is under a statute "substantially equivalent" 
to an Idaho statute is a question of law given free review. See State v. 
Dickerson, 142 Idaho 514, 517, 129 P.3d 1263, 1266 (Ct. App. 2006). 
C. First Degree Sexual Conduct Is The Substantial Equivalent Of Idaho 
Crimes Requiring Sex Offender Registration 
The Sex Offender Registration Act applies to any person "convicted of any 
crime . . . in another jurisdiction ... that is substantially equivalent" to the Idaho 
offenses requiring registration. I.C. § 18-8304(b).3 The Idaho offenses requiring 
registration include lewd conduct with a child, I.C. § 18-1508, and rape, I.C. § 18-
6101 (excluding subsection (1) "where the defendant is 18 years of age"). 1.C. § 
18-8304(1 ). Lewd conduct with a child is committed by performing "any lewd or 
lascivious act" on a child under 16, including genital to genital contact. I.C. § 18-
1508. Rape includes the sexual penetration of a female under the age of 16. 
I.C. § 18-6101 (1 ). The Michigan crime at issue was committed by "sexual 
penetration" of a "person under 13 years of age." Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 
750b(1 )(a). Even a cursory comparison shows that the Michigan offense was 
"substantially equivalent" to crimes requiring sexual registration under Idaho law. 
3 This subsection was amended in 2013 in a manner that does not affect the 
analysis. 2013 Idaho Session Laws, ch. 240, § 3, p. 566 . 
. 10 
requ 
Johnston first argues that the state "failed to prove Mr. Johnston was 
register in Michigan." (Appellant's brief, pp. 8-9.) Although it is 
that the state did not prove this requirement at the hearing on the motion to 
dismiss, Johnston's argument is irrelevant because the state had no duty to 
prove its case at that point. That is what trials are for. At the hearing on the 
motion to dismiss neither side presented evidence. Rather, Johnston argued that 
he did not have a duty to register in Michigan (2/10/14 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 17-18), and 
the prosecutor argued that the state had no duty to present evidence, and made 
an offer of proof that Johnston had admitted to the police that he was required to 
register in Michigan, Indiana, and Idaho. (2/10/14 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 10-25.4) 
Johnston's argument that the state failed to prove his guilt in response to a 
motion to dismiss is frivolous. 
Johnston next argues that the state failed to prove what subsection of the 
Michigan statute he was convicted under. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-12.) Again, 
Johnston appears to be under the misapprehension that the state had the burden 
to prove his guilt at the motion hearing. To the contrary, Johnston waived his 
right to have the state prove his guilt when he entered a guilty plea. Because 
Johnston has presented no law indicating that the state had any burden of 
producing evidence or proving elements of the crime to defeat his motion to 
dismiss, his argument fails. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 
4 This evidence was presented at the preliminary hearing. (4/05/13 Tr., p. 8, L. 9 
- p. 12, L. 6.) Johnston's motion to dismiss did not challenge the sufficiency of 
the evidence to establish probable cause. (R., pp. 96-110.) 
11 
970 (1996) (Court will disregard arguments unsupported by citation to legal 
authority). 
Johnston's arguments rely upon his underlying false assumption that the 
state had to prove his guilt at the hearing on his motion to dismiss. This renders 
his arguments frivolous. He has failed to show that the district court erred when 
it concluded that Johnston's Michigan conviction for First Degree Sexual Conduct 
was substantially equivalent to offenses requiring registration in Idaho. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's 
judgment. 
DATED this 27th day of October, 
KENNETH K. JORRE \ s 
Deputy Attorney Genera 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 27th day of October, 2015, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
SALLY J. COOLEY 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in the State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
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